Healthcare is an absolute priority for Democrats when the 120th Congress meets in January 2027. The enhanced Obamacare subsidies expired at the end of 2025, and millions of Americans now face higher insurance costs. The obvious Democratic response should be to restore the subsidies within the first “100 hours” of gaining power in Congress.
But there is another, better, more principled option. Congress should stop using the tax code to design healthcare.
The One Big Beautiful Bill Act moved policy in this direction. Congress can, and should, adopt this new precedent.
Starting in January 2026, under IRS Notice 2026-05, consumers could combine ongoing Health Savings Account contributions with direct primary care subscriptions. This was a genuine and valuable reform that will enhance the health outcomes for millions of Americans. The Republican reform removed a tax obstacle. Previously, joining a typical direct primary care practice could prevent further HSA contributions. Now a qualifying arrangement can coexist with continued contributions.
But Congress could not resist deciding what qualified, rather than letting consumers choose. They set price caps and specified the types of practitioners, services, and payment arrangements that could qualify.
These are not consumer protection measures, but rather tax revenue measures obsessed with tax scoring – the so-called cost to government of money it no longer receives through tax cuts, deductions, or credits. It turns out that private citizens spending too much of their own money on their own health is a cost to government.
It gets worse. These sorts of caps inhibit organizational innovation. Healthcare providers have incentives to offer a bundle of services to consumers at affordable prices while earning a profit. A practice could cut its fee to satisfy the new provisions but engage in other trade-offs to compensate. It might shorten consultations, grow its customer base, remove services from the subscription, or fire staff to comply with federal rules.
Importantly, some types of practices that consumers might want might never open because Congress's rules don’t allow them to do so.
Now we tend to associate healthcare innovation with new drugs, devices, and treatments. But entrepreneurs also innovate by organizing familiar services in new ways. Organizational entrepreneurship ensures that innovation is delivered at scale. Successful arrangements will then be copied, bringing better access or lower costs to many consumers.
Nobody, including the entrepreneur and especially Congress, knows in advance whether a new arrangement will succeed. Businesses commit resources; consumers choose; profits and losses sort successful experiments from failures. Congress cannot reproduce that process by writing a definition into the tax code.
When Congress expands tax-advantaged healthcare spending, the Joint Committee on Taxation estimates the revenue Treasury will forgo. That number becomes a political obstacle. Yet there is no corresponding budget line for a practice never opened, a staffing model never tested, or a cheaper service never discovered.
Tax scoring does have its place. It tells legislators something about federal revenue. It does not tell them whether Americans would be better off with the freedom to spend more of their pre-tax income on care they choose.
An expanded HSA is not a direct replacement for help with insurance premiums, particularly for people unable to save much. But that is no reason to preserve a tax system that favors some ways of financing healthcare and penalizes others.
Democrats should build on the Republican reform. Raise HSA contribution limits, broaden access, and remove needless rules governing how providers assemble services. Better still, move towards equal tax treatment for healthcare spending regardless of whether consumers pay through an employer's insurance plan, a savings account, or directly.
The government can estimate the tax revenue it gives up—but it can’t even begin to count how many superior healthcare arrangements its rules prevent from being discovered.
Sinclair Davidson is Professor of Institutional Economics in the School of Economics, Finance and Marketing at RMIT University and an Adjunct Economics Fellow with the Consumer Choice Center.